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The Right to Be Heard in City of Sherrill
v. Oneida Indian Nation: Equity and the
Sound of Silence
Derrick Braaten*
From the beginning of your troubles, in the late Revolution, to
the time you publicly declared yourselves a free and
independent people, I, my Nation, were a constant spectatornot only a constant spectator-but our minds united with
yours in that final declaration; as all hopes of a reconciliation
were then passed. The frequent & repeated declarations of the
King, that the Americans with all who joined them, would be
reduced to wretchedness, had no effect upon the minds of my
Nation. And on the other hand, his promises of a rich reward,
on condition of our adhering to his councils, did not excite
covetous desires in us; but the love of peace, and the love of
our land which gave us birth, supported our resolutions.1
Introduction
While recent court decisions have gone a long way toward
recognizing American Indians' rights to lands from which they
have been illegally dispossessed, 2 the recent Supreme Court
3
decision in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York
now threatens to inflict further injustice on not only the Oneida,
but on all American Indian tribes seeking redress for historical
wrongs related to their lands. 4 The case concerns properties
J.D. Candidate, 2007, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A., University
of Minnesota-Morris. I would like to thank Larry Leventhal and David Garelick
for their help and encouragement, and for the many opportunities they have
provided me. I would also like to thank the editors and staff of this journal,
particularly Luke Garret, for their many helpful comments, suggestions, and hard
work. Finally, I would like to thank my parents, Clint and Karen Braaten, and my
brother, Ben Braaten, for their support, encouragement, and unending faith in me.
1. Lagwilondonwas, an important Oneida leader and public speaker, Oneida
Indian Nation,
Culture
& History,
available at http://www.oneidanation.net/pt3.html.
2. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 470 U.S. 226 (1985)
[hereinafter Oneida II]; Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. County of Oneida, 414
U.S. 661 (1974) [hereinafter Oneida I]. But see Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v.
Pataki, 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005).
3. City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197 (2005).
4. See generally Cayuga Indian Nation, 413 F.3d 266.
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purchased on the open market by the Oneida Indian Nation of
New York (Oneida or OIN), which are located in the City of
Sherrill, New York. 5 Because these parcels of property were
located within their historical reservation, the Oneida refused to
pay property taxes to the City of Sherrill on their newly acquired
property. 6 The Oneida sought a declaration that, inter alia, the
City of Sherrill could not impose property taxes on the Oneida's
lands. 7 Conversely, the City of Sherrill's primary claim is that it
may properly assess such taxes.8 The United States District Court
for the Northern District of New York determined that the parcels
were not taxable, 9 and the city appealed. On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the
District Court regarding the taxation claim.1o The case came
before the Supreme Court after it granted the City of Sherrill's
Petition for Writ of Certiorari.11
The Supreme Court certified four questions for review,1 2 but
13
rested its final holding on issues not explicitly raised for review.
The majority opinion denied relief to the Oneida based on the
14
equitable principles of laches, acquiescence, and impossibility.
Neither party fully briefed the Court on these issues in their briefs
pending certiorari, 15 leaving the Court without important
information and legal arguments necessary for the proper
application of these principles to the present case. 16 This article
5. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. City of Sherrill, N.Y., 145 F. Supp. 2d 226,
232 (N.D.N.Y. 2001).
6. Id. at 236-38.
7. Id. at 237.
8. Id. at 237-38.
9. Id. at 255-56.
10. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. City of Sherrill, N.Y., 337 F.3d 139, 171 (2d
Cir. 2003).
11. City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 542 U.S. 936 (2004)
(granting certiorari to City of Sherrill).
12. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian
Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197 (Dec. 11, 2003) (No. 03-855), 2003 WL 22977923
[hereinafter Petition].
13. See City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197, 202

(2005).
14. Id.
15. See Brief for Petitioner, City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of
N.Y., 544 U.S. 197 (August 12, 2004) (No. 03-855), 2004 WL 1835364; Brief for
Respondents, City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197
(Sept. 30, 2004) (No. 03-855), 2004 WL 2246333; Petitioner's Reply Brief, City of
Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197 (Nov. 18, 2004) (No.
03-855), 2004 WL 2671307.
16. See infra Part IV.
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argues that full briefing is necessary for the proper application of
these principles, which is in turn necessary to do justice for the
Oneida as well as other tribes seeking relief for similar claims
presently and in the future. 17 The Supreme Court's failure to
allow full briefing on the issues upon which the case was
ultimately decided violates the Court's own rules in a manner that
denies the Oneida their due process right to be heard.18 Had the
Court heard the Oneida on these issues, the Oneida could have
made several very persuasive arguments to show the injustice of
invoking equity to deny relief to a valid cause of action.1 9
Part I of this article will set out the legal history and context
of the Oneida claims and property rights, illustrating the basis of
their cause of action for dispossession of historical tribal lands,
and the facts and procedural history of this case. Part II will
discuss the Supreme Court's rules regarding the contents of a
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, the purpose of these rules, and the
due process implications of refusing to follow them. Part II will
then argue that the Court was not fully briefed by the parties
regarding the equitable principles it applied, as its own rules and
precedent strongly suggest it should. The Court, therefore, was
lacking legal arguments and factual information, resulting in an
unjust adverse judgment for the Oneida, as well as a denial of the
Oneida's due process right to be heard.20 Part III will discuss the
principles of equity the majority applied in City of Sherrill. Part
IV will lay out several equitable arguments that the Oneida would
have been allowed to make had they been given their Due Process
right to be heard. Part IV will first argue that although the Court
applied equitable principles based on the premise that the Oneida
sat on their cause of action for close to 200 years, the actual cause
of action did not accrue until the Oneida purchased the properties
at issue and the City of Sherrill attempted to levy taxes upon
them. 21 Second, Part IV will argue that even if the Court's
purported length of time over which the Oneida were guilty of
laches and acquiescence is applied, the Court fails to recognize
that the Oneida actually made continued objections to the loss of
their lands over that period. 22 Next, Part IV will show that certain

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See
See
See
See
See
See

infra Part II.
infra Part II.
infra Part IV.
infra notes 83-125 and accompanying text.
infra notes 147-54 and accompanying text.
infra notes 155-68 and accompanying text.
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legislation and Congressional history are in direct contravention
to the majority's application of equitable principles used to deny
the Oneida the relief sought. 23 Finally, Part IV will discuss the
concept of applying laches against a sovereign entity charged with
the duty of protecting the public interest, and will show how this
concept logically applies to American Indian tribes as well as the
24
United States Government.
I. Purchases Made in Violation of the Non-Intercourse Act
and the Historic Title to and Possession of the Oneida
Lands Led the Courts to Recognize the Oneida's Valid
Claim to These Lands
A. History, Title, and Possession of Oneida Lands
The Oneida are one of the Five Nations of the League of the
Iroquois, which dominated most of the Northeastern United States
before the American Revolution. 25 The Oneida's aboriginal lands
originally encompassed some six million acres in New York
State. 26 During the Revolution, the Oneida gave considerable aid
to the colonists, 27 and the United States subsequently recognized
the importance of the Oneida's role by securing to them their lands
in the Treaty of Fort Stanwix. 28 In 1788, the State of New York
purchased the vast majority of the Oneida's lands, leaving some
300,000 acres as a reservation for the Oneida. 29 These lands were
again secured to the Oneida in the Treaty of Fort Harmar 30 and
the Treaty of Canandaigua, 31 with the latter treaty including the
parcels at issue in City of Sherrill. Such treaties "made... under
the Authority of the United States. .. [are] the Supreme Law of
the Land,"' 32 and should thus be given the proper respect in a court

23. See infra notes 169-74 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
25. PHILIP WEEKS, FAREWELL, MY NATION 15 (Harlan Davidson, Inc. 2001)

(1990).
26. See Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226, 230 (1985).
27. See generally BARBARA

GRAYMONT,

THE IROQUOIS IN THE AMERICAN

REVOLUTION (Syracuse University Press 1972).
28. Treaty of Fort Stanwix, art. 2, Oct. 22, 1784, 7 Stat. 15, 15 (promising that
"[t]he Oneida ...nation[] shall be secured in the possession of the lands on which
they are settled").
29. Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 231.
30. Treaty of Harmar, Jan. 9, 1789, 7 Stat. 33.
31. Treaty of Canandaigua, Nov. 11, 1794, 7 Stat. 44.
32. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl.2.
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of law.
After New York State's purchase of lands from the Oneida in
1788, Congress passed the first Indian Trade and Intercourse Act,
commonly referred to as the Non-Intercourse Act, which
prohibited conveyance of Indian lands except by treaty with the
United States federal government.3 3 In 1795, despite warnings
from Secretary of War Pickering that the transactions would be
illegal, New York State purchased most of the remaining Oneida
land in violation of the Non-Intercourse Act. 34 The land was
thereafter sold to private purchasers on the open market. 35 The
Supreme Court later held that this initial illegal purchase by New
York State gave rise to a federal common law right of action for
36
violation of the Oneida's possessory interest in the land.
After the United States government turned to a policy of
removing the American Indians from their lands, the Oneida
entered into the Treaty of Buffalo Creek 37 with the federal
government. 38 This treaty negotiated an exchange of Oneida lands
in New York for lands reserved for the Oneida in Kansas. 39 The
Oneida did not, however, actually relocate to Kansas. 40 The
Treaty of Buffalo Creek did not disestablish the Oneida's
reservation, 41 but over the years the Oneida did lose the vast
majority of their New York lands primarily through private sales
not sanctioned by the federal government, with the total acreage
dwindling to as little as 32 acres in 1920.42
33. See Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000)).
34. Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 232.
35. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. City of Sherrill, N.Y., 145 F. Supp. 2d 226,
234 (N.D.N.Y. 2001).
36. Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 236.
37. Treaty with the New York Indians, Jan. 15, 1838, 7 Stat. 550.
38. See, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 145 F. Supp. 2d at 234-35.
39. Id. at 235.
40. Id.
41. Both the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York
and United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed that this treaty
did not diminish the Oneida's historic reservation and that the lands remained
Indian Country, which is not subject to taxation by Sherrill. See id. at 254. ("[T]his
land is Indian Country and is not taxable by Sherrill and the Counties."); Oneida
Indian Nation of N.Y. v. City of Sherrill, N.Y., 337 F.3d 139, 165 (2d. Cir. 2003)
("Construing the Buffalo Creek Treaty liberally and resolving, as we must, all
ambiguities in the Oneidas' favor, we conclude that neither its text nor the
circumstances surrounding its passage and implementation establish a clear
congressional purpose to disestablish or diminish the OIN reservation."); see also
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2005) (defining Indian Country).
42. JACK CAMPISI & LAURENCE HAUPTMAN, THE ONEIDA INDIAN EXPERIENCE:
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During the time that the Oneida were being divested of their
land by the State of New York, "the Oneidas contacted the federal
government in protest over what they perceived as improper,
deceitful, and overreaching conduct by the State. Their protest
continued, especially between 1840 and 1875, and between 1909
43
and 1965."
B. The Recent Oneida Legal Actions
In 1970 the Oneida sought damages from two counties in
New York State for the fair rental value of lands taken in violation
of their possessory rights. 44 The case was dismissed by the
District Court for lack of jurisdiction; and after the dismissal was
affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, 45 the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed and
remanded in Oneida .46 Upon remand, the District Court heard
the case, entered judgment for the Oneida, and awarded damages
accordingly. 47 After appeal, 48 the case again came before the
Supreme Court in Oneida 1. 49 The Supreme Court held that,
inter alia, the Oneida have a 'live cause of action for a violation of
[their] possessory rights that occurred 175 years ago."50 While the
Court did not rule on whether the doctrine of laches could apply to
the action, it did note in dicta that "the equitable doctrine of
laches.. .cannot properly have application to give vitality to a void
deed and to bar the rights of Indian wards in lands subject to
'
statutory restrictions. "51
Subsequently, in the 1990s the Oneida began reacquiring
their lost tribal lands in free market transactions, 52 eventually
giving rise to the dispute that came before the Supreme Court in

Two PERSPECTIVES

61 (1988).
43. See Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Oneida County, 719 F.2d 525, 529 (2d
Cir. 1983).
44. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. County of Oneida, 464 F.2d 916 (2d Cir.
1972).
45. Id.
46. Oneida I, 414 U.S. 661 (1974).
47. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. County of Oneida, 434 F.Supp. 527
(N.D.N.Y. 1977).
48. See generally Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y, 719 F.2d 525.
49. Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226 (1985).
50. Id. at 230.
51. Id. at 244-45 n.16 (citing Ewert v. Bluejacket, 259 U.S. 129, 138 (1922)).
52. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. City of Sherrill, N.Y., 145 F. Supp. 2d 226,
236 (N.D.N.Y. 2001).
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City of Sherrill.53 The Oneida sued the City of Sherrill to
terminate its efforts to assess property taxes on land owned by the
tribe and located within the City of Sherrill, because the lands are
a part of their reservation as recognized by the Treaty of
Canandaigua.5 4 The Oneida claimed that because the properties
constitute reservation land and are, therefore, Indian Country as
defined by federal law, 55 the state and its political subdivisions are
precluded from imposing taxes.5 6 The City of Sherrill sought a
declaration that it may properly assess taxes on the properties at
issue as well as any properties that may come into the Oneida's
possession in the future.57 While the parties brought a welter of
claims and counterclaims before the District Court, the issues in
dispute were significantly narrowed by the time the case came
before the Supreme Court on certiorari. 58 The Supreme Court
certified four questions of law,59 but the majority dedicated almost
its entire analysis to the principles of equity upon which it
60
ultimately decided the case.
II. The Supreme Court Deprived the Oneida of Due
Process and Violated Its Own Rules by Basing Its
Decision on Principles Not Presented in the Petition for
Writ of Certiorari and Not Fully Briefed by Either Party
A. The Court's Own Rules Provide ProceduralProtections
that Should Not Be Contravened
The Court's Rule 14 is titled "Content for a Petition for a Writ
61
of Certiorari" and sets out the requirements for such a petition.
According to this rule, a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari must
53. City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197 (2005).
54. See Oneida Indian Nation ofN. Y, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 236-37.
55. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2005) (defining Indian Country).
56. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 145 F. Supp. 2d at 237; see also U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("Congress shall have the power...to regulate commerce.. .with the
Indian tribes.").
57. Oneida Indian Nation ofN. Y., 145 F. Supp. 2d at 237-38.
58. Compare Complaint, Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. City of Sherrill, N.Y.,
145 F. Supp. 2d 226 (N.D.N.Y. Jun 04, 2001) (No. 5:00-CV-223, 5:00-CV-506, 5:00CV-327, 5:00-CV-1106) with Petition, supranote 12.
59. See Petition, supra note 12 (stating the four questions Petitioner requested
the Court to resolve).
60. See City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197,
215-21 (2005).
61. See SUP. CT. R. 14.
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contain "[t]he questions presented for review, expressed concisely
in relation to the circumstances of the case, without unnecessary
detail.
The questions should be short and should not be
argumentative or repetitive." 62 Notably, the rule also states that
"[o]nly the questions set out in the petition, or fairly included
63
therein, will be considered by the Court."
64
After granting certiorari in Ballard v. Commissioner,
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, noted that the basis of
the Court's decision was not discretely presented as a question for
review by the Court. 65 It was, however, considered "a question
anterior to all other questions the parties raised, and the [basis of
the decision was] indeed aired in the [parties'] briefs." 66 For a
question to be "fairly included within" the questions presented for
67
review, it must be truly anterior to the questions presented."
The specific meaning of "anterior" thus becomes significant
because the Court has made clear that a "subsidiary question" is
not a question that is simply related to or complementary to those
presented, but must actually be fairly included within the
68
questions specifically presented.
In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that "[i]t bespeaks
the weakness of the [petitioner's] arguments that the Court hinges
its conclusion on an argument not even presented for our
consideration." 69 Citing to the same rule as Ginsburg, Justice
Rehnquist concluded that the Supreme Court "does not consider
claims that are not included within a petitioner's questions
presented." 70 To support his argument, Justice Rehnquist cited to
Yee v. City of Escondido, Cal.,71 which offers a more thorough
discussion of the purpose and practice regarding the Court's Rule
14.72 In Yee, the majority explained that the petitioner (for a Writ
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Ballard v. Comm'r Internal Revenue, 544 U.S. 40, 47 n.2 (2005)
65. Id.
66. Id. (emphasis added).
67. See id. (emphasis added).
68. See Yee v. City of Escondido, Cal., 503 U.S. 519, 537 (1992) (noting that
question not presented in petition for certiorari was a "question related to the one
petitioners presented, and perhaps complementary to the one petitioners presented,
but it is not 'fairly included therein."') (emphasis added in footnote quotation).
69. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 45 n.1.
70. Id. (emphasis added).
71. Yee, 503 U.S. at 535-38.
72. See id.
The language used by Justice Rehnquist seems to distinguish a claim not
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of Certiorari) controls the scope of the questions presented, and is
able to frame these questions as broadly or narrowly as is
necessary to the case and disputes at issue. 73 How questions are
framed for review is significant because the Court will only
address those questions that are either set forth in the petition or
However, it "ordinarily [will] not
fairly included therein.7 4
consider questions outside those presented in the petition for
75
certiorari."
One of the important purposes of Rule 14.1(a) is to give the
respondent notice of the grounds on which certiorari is being
sought, so that respondents can direct their arguments toward
those specific grounds.7 6 Beyond the arguments that a respondent
can make to the Court that it should deny certiorari, the notice
given in the petition is also important to allow both sides to fully
brief the actual issues that the Court will consider. The Court
must have a full briefing of the issues so it is capable of the sound
analysis required for a just result. 77 Notably, rulings that are not
based on such a full briefing are not typically given the same
precedential value as those that are fully briefed. 78 Indeed, the
Court has stated clearly that "[t]he fundamental requisite of due
process of law is the opportunity to be heard." 79 The opportunity
to respond is also fundamental to due process.80 Furthermore:
For more than a century the central meaning of procedural

presented from a question not presented. While, as Justice Ginsburg
argues, Supreme Court Rule 14 allows for the Court to consider subsidiary
questions, there is a difference between a legal claim, and a subsidiary
question necessary to answer the questions actually presented to the
Court.
Id. (emphasis added in footnote quotation).
73. Yee, 503 U.S. at 535.
74. Id.
75. Id. (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 443 n.38 (1984)); see also
Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1994) (refusing to consider question of
collateral estoppel that was not raised in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, noting
that "[t]he question presented in the petition was whether the reservation had been
diminished by acts of congress. This Court's Rule 14.1(a) does not appear to allow
different issues to be raised").
76. Yee, 503 U.S. at 535-36.
77. Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 552-53 n.3 (1990) ("Applying
our analysis ... to the facts of a particular case without the benefit of a full record
or lower court determinations is not a sensible exercise of this Court's discretion.").
78. Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 251 (1998) ("[W]e have felt less
constrained to follow precedent where, as here, the opinion was rendered without
full briefing or argument.").
79. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) (citing Louisville & N. R. Co. v.
Schmidt, 177 U. S. 230, 236 (1900); Simon v. Craft, 182 U. S. 427, 436 (1901)).
80. See Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 466 (2000).
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due process has been clear: "Parties whose rights are to be
affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may
enjoy that right they must first be notified." It is equally
fundamental that the right to notice and an opportunity to be
heard "must be granted at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner."'
Thus, by only addressing those questions presented or fairly
included within those questions, the Supreme Court ensures that
both parties have an opportunity to be heard in accordance with
82
due process requirements when certiorari is granted.
B.

The Principles Upon Which the Court Based Its Holding
in City of Sherrill Were Not Addressed by the Actual
QuestionsPresentedfor Review

The Supreme Court ultimately decided that the Oneida could
8 3
not "rekindl[e] embers of sovereignty that long ago grew cold."
The Court admitted that it was resolving the case "on
considerations not discretely identified in the parties' briefs."8 4 In
a footnote, the Court continued:
But the question of equitable considerations limiting the relief
available to OIN, which we reserved in Oneida II, is
inextricably linked to, and is thus "fairly included" within, the
questions presented.
See this Court's Rule 14.1(a) ("The
statement of any question presented is deemed to comprise
every subsidiary question fairly included therein."); Ballard v.
Commissioner, 544 U.S.
, -, n. 2, 125 S.Ct. 1270, 1275,
n. 2, 161 L.Ed.2d 227 (2005); R.A.V v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
381, n. 3, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992). See
generally R. Stern, E. Gressman, S. Shapiro, & K. Geller,
Supreme Court Practice 414 (8th ed. 2002) ("Questions not
explicitly mentioned but essential to analysis of the decisions
below or to the correct disposition of the other issues have
been treated as subsidiary
issues fairly comprised by the
85
question presented.").
Petitioner City of Sherrill presented the following questions

81. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (citations omitted).
82. While the facts of Grannis and Nelson are distinguishable from the case at
issue here, there are strong arguments for the extension of the principles presented
in those cases. For a thorough discussion of the implications of these principles,
see Barry A. Miller, Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts Deprive Litigants
of an Opportunity to be Heard, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1253, 1291-93 (2002).

83. City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197, 214
(2005).
84. Id. at 214 n.8.
85. Id.
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to the Court:
1. Whether alleged reservation land is Indian Country
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1151 and this Court's decision in
Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520
(1998) ("Venetie") where the land was neither set aside by the
federal government nor superintended by the federal
government?
2. Whether alleged reservation land was set aside by the
federal government for purposes of Indian Country analysis
under 18 U.S.C. § 1151 and Venetie where the alleged
reservation was established by the State of New York in the
1788 Treaty of Fort Schuyler, and not by any federal treaty,
action or enactment?
3. Whether the 1838 Treaty of Buffalo Creek, which required
the New York Oneidas to permanently abandon their lands in
New York, resulted in the disestablishment of the Oneida's
alleged New York reservation?
4. Whether
Country or
Intercourse
reservation
86

alleged reservation land may (i) remain Indian
(ii) be subject to the protections of the NonAct, 25 U.S.C. § 177, if the tribe claiming
status and Non-Intercourse Act protection ceases

to exist?

There is neither mention of any principles of equity in the
preceding questions nor what might be an appropriate remedy in
this case. The Court itself notes that "[tihe substantive questions
whether the plaintiff has any right or the defendant any duty, and
if so what it is, are very different questions from the remedial
questions whether this remedy or that is preferred, and what the
measure

of

the

remedy

is."7

In

keeping

with

such

an

understanding, the Oneida submitted a brief to the Court that did
not address any of the questions regarding principles of equity or
appropriate remedies.8 8 While the City of Sherrill did mention
briefly the long lapse of time since the Oneida were dispossessed of
their lands illegally, the argument was in a reply brief filed over a
month after the Oneida filed their Respondent Brief with the
Court.8 9 Thus, the Oneida had no fair opportunity to address the

86. Petition, supra note 12.
87. City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 213 (citing DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY, RESTITUTION § 1.2 (2d ed. 1973)) (emphasis

added).
88. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 15.
89. See id.; Petitioner's Reply Brief, supra note 15.
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issues upon which the Court ultimately decided the case.
Despite not being briefed on the issues of laches,
impossibility, or acquiescence, the Court considered those
principles "inextricably linked" to the above-listed questions
regarding the establishment and alleged disestablishment of the
Oneida's reservation. 90 In a footnote, the majority glossed over its
weak support for considering these questions at all. 91 Further, the
majority ignored several important arguments that would defeat
recognition of such equitable principles as being "fairly included
92
within" the questions actually presented for review.
C. The Court's Past Discussion of Rule 14 Does Not
Support Inclusion of the Relevant Equitable Principles
into the Questions Presented for Review in City of
Sherrill
The Supreme Court has often noted that it will not address
questions not presented for review in a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari. 93 The principles upon which the majority decided City
of Sherrill clearly were not presented in the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, but more importantly, they also cannot fairly be
included within those questions.
As Justice Ginsburg noted in Ballard, a question may fairly
be included within those presented if that question is anterior to
those presented. 94 "Anterior" is defined as "situated before or
toward the front," or "coming before in time or development."95 To
be included fairly within questions presented to the Court, an
issue must not simply be complementary or related to those
presented, but must be a question required for the analysis of the
questions actually presented to the Court. 96 Both the United
States District Court for the Northern District of New York and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
90. City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 214 n.8.
91. Id.
92. Id. (emphasis added).
93. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998) ("It is our practice to
decide cases on the grounds raised and considered in the Court of Appeals and
included in the question on which we granted certiorari.") (citing Blessing v.
Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 n.3 (1997)) (declining to address an issue because it
was not presented in the petition in accordance with SUP. CT. R. 14.1(a)).
94. Ballard v. Comm'r Internal Revenue, 544 U.S. 40, 47 n.2 (2005).
95. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 49 (10th Ed. 1999).
96. See Ballard,544 U.S. at 47 n.2.
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analyzed the issues presented in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari
without finding it necessary to address the equitable issues and
considerations of appropriate remedy considered by the Supreme
Court. 97 Thus, the majority did not need to address the equitable
principles to analyze the legal questions actually presented for
review.
Furthermore, the questions presented to the Court were
connected to the legal analysis of the Oneida's right to tax
exemption as it sprung from the confirmation that the lands they
98
recently purchased were a part of the tribe's historic reservation.
The question as to remedy is one logically considered only after a
finding that a party is indeed entitled to any remedy. Therefore,
the Court could not maintain that the question of the appropriate
remedy was anterior to the analysis of the legal questions
presented. By definition, determining the propriety of a remedy
was inherently posterior to the question of whether a party was
entitled to any remedy at all.
While Supreme Court Rule 14 is prudential in nature, the
Court disregards it "only in the most exceptional cases." 99 The
rule is also "more than a precatory admonition." 100 The Court will
only make an exception to the rule when overruling a prior
decision (even when neither party has requested it), when seeking
to avoid deciding a case on constitutional grounds when it is
capable of doing otherwise, when raising sua sponte in absence of
jurisdiction, and when under Supreme Court Rule 24.1(a) there is
a plain error evident in the record and within the Court's
jurisdiction to decide. 10 1 Having such specific exceptions ensures
that the Court will not be "tempted to engage in ill-considered
decisions of questions not presented in the petition."'102 The Court
here did not overrule any of its prior decisions, 0 3 was not
explicitly declining to rule on constitutional grounds 104 or consider
97. See Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. City of Sherrill, N.Y., 145 F. Supp. 2d
226 (N.D.N.Y. 2001); Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. City of Sherrill, N.Y., 337
F.3d 139 (2d. Cir. 2003).
98. See Petition, supra note 12.
99. Yee v. City of Escondido, Cal., 503 U.S. 519, 535 (1992).
100. Id.
101. See Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 510 U.S.
27, 33 (1993).
102. See id. at 34.
103. City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197, 221
(2005) (declining to address legal questions decided in other previous cases, and
noting "we therefore do not disturb our holding in Oneida II.").
104. While the issues in question did relate to constitutional issues, the
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a jurisdictional issue, and was not addressing what it thought was
105
a clear error in the lower courts.
The issues upon which the Court decided the case were
barely discussed in any brief, 106 something to which the Court
typically attaches great weight when making a decision. In very
clear language, the Court has stated that analyzing facts without
the benefit of a full record or a lower court's determination on an
10 7
issue is not a sensible exercise of the Court's discretion.
Questions not raised or briefed by the parties for the Supreme
Court are typically "questions for the Court of Appeals or the
District Court to consider and determine in the first instance."' 08
Perhaps most convincing is the confession by Justice Souter
in his concurring opinion that "the subject of inaction was not
expressly raised as a separate question presented for review." 109
Justice Souter goes on to conclude that because the parties
addressed the equitable issues during oral arguments there was
no difficulty with addressing these "separate questions."11 A brief
inspection of the transcript of the oral argument shows that oral
Presumably,
arguments ran a total of one hour and one minute.'
Petitioner and Respondent each received one half-hour to split
between themselves and their respective supporting amicus
curiae.112 Considering that at least half of that time was devoted
to the legal issues of the case, there remained very little time for
the Oneida to make their case regarding equitable issues to the
113
Court.
Given the scant time available, the Oneida surely did not
fully prepare to argue issues not even contained in the petition.
Rather, it is likely that the Oneida's counsel was only prepared to
argue the issues in dispute in the case-the issues upon which the
Supreme Court granted certiorari. Further, Justice Ginsburg, the
questions presented were asking the Court to analyze 18 U.S.C. § 1151 and 25
U.S.C. § 177, and to interpret the language of a treaty, not its constitutionality.
See Petition, supranote 12; City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 197-200.
105. See City of Sherrill,544 U.S. at 197-200.
106. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 15.
107. Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 552 n.3 (1990).
108. See Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 205 (2001).
109. City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 222.
110. Id.
111. Transcript of Oral Argument, City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation
of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197 (Jan. 11, 2005) (No. 03-855), 2005 WL 148904.
112. Id.
113. Id. While it is difficult to determine precisely when the parties and Court
spoke specifically to the equitable issues, the transcript supports this estimate.
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author of the majority opinion in City of Sherrill, has herself
pointed out that "the brief is far more persuasive than the oral
argument." 114
Other authorities also have noted that oral
arguments are not nearly as important or decisive for a party
presenting their case as the written briefs.11 5 Thus, Justice
Souter's note that the parties were able to offer cursory and
superficial arguments on what were eventually the most
important issues for the case is not availing, and does not cure the
infirmity of deciding this case without comprehensive briefing.
The Court here ignored its own rule and a multitude of its
own statements regarding the propriety of deciding a case on an
issue not raised or fully briefed by either party. As will be
discussed below, the majority did not fully hear several strong
arguments that would have made apparent the unjust and illinformed nature of the result it sought to justify in its decision.
D. Considering the Principles of Equity Upon Which the
Court Rests Its Decision Is an Unjust and UnfairDenial
of the Oneida's Due Process Right to be Heard
Supreme Court Rule 14 serves to give a party notice of the
issues that the opposing party is seeking to have reviewed.11 6
Normally, the Court "strongly 'disapprove[s] the practice of
smuggling additional questions into a case after [it] grant[s]
certiorari."' 1 7 When the parties do not have notice of what the
issues coming before the Court will be, and are therefore unable to
fully brief the Court, they are being denied the right to be fully
heard on what may become the most pertinent and decisive issues
in their case. 118 The right to be heard by the Court and to respond
to the opposing party's arguments are both fundamental aspects of
due process. 11 9
114. Sarah E. Valentine, Ruth Bader Ginsburg: An Annotated Bibliography, 7
N.Y. CITY L. REV. 391, 421 (2004) (discussing generally the importance of briefs
over oral arguments) (emphasis added).
115. See Mark Cooney, Get Real About Research and Writing, 32(9) STUDENT
LAWYER, May 2004, available at http://www.abanet.orglsd/studentlawyer/
may04/get-real.html (discussing the diminished importance oral arguments have
on the outcome of a case).
116. SUP. CT. R. 14. See also Yee v. City of Escondido, Cal., 503 U.S. 519, 535-36
(1992).
117. Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 510 U.S. 27,
34 (1993) (citing Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 129 (1954) (plurality opinion)).
118. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
119. See Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) (citing Nelson v. Adams
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The majority significantly hindered the Oneida's ability to
respond to their opponent's arguments and to be fully heard by the
Court because the equitable issues on which the case was
ultimately decided were raised only after the Oneida had filed
their brief. The City of Sherrill did not raise the issue of laches,
acquiescence, or impossibility in its original brief to the Court; in
120
fact, it devoted only a small section of a reply brief to the issue.
More importantly, because the reply brief was filed over a month
after the Oneida presented their written arguments to the
Court, 121 the Oneida neither had an opportunity to raise several
very important legal arguments nor provide factual information
that had great bearing on the case. While there was some
discussion of these equitable principles during oral argument with
122
counsel for the Oneida and the United States as amicus curiae,
the majority of the oral arguments were devoted to the legal
23
questions addressed in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
Nevertheless, the Court rested its holding almost entirely on these
principles of equity.124 This decision is of immense importance for
the Oneida as well as many other American Indian tribes. 125 The
Court must have the issues fully briefed and argued in order to
make a just decision and ensure that the Oneida are not deprived
of their due process right to be heard. Even if the Court refused to
recognize the violation of the due process rights of the Oneida,
there are still several arguments not fully presented to the Court
that demonstrate the gross inequity of denying the Oneida relief
based upon principles of equity such as laches.
III. The Supreme Court Invoked Principles of Equity to
Justify Its Holding Rather than Relying on Legal
Principles Alone
The majority begins its analysis in City of Sherrill by stating

USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 466 (2000) (holding that the opportunity to respond is
"fundamental to due process"); Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427, 436 (1901); Louisville
& N. R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U. S. 230, 236 (1900)).
120. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 15; Petitioner's Reply Brief, supra note
15.
121. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 15; Petitioner's Reply Brief, supra
note 15.
122. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 11, at 32-34, 43-46.
123. See Petition, supra note 12.
124. City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197 (2005).
125. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners, Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Pataki,
02-6111 (L), 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005).
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that "[t]he substantive questions of whether the plaintiff has any
right or the defendant any duty, and if so what it is, are very
different questions from the remedial questions whether this
remedy or that is preferred, and what the measure of the remedy
is."126 The relief sought by the Oneida was evaluated within the
context of the long history of sovereign control of the lands at issue
by the State of New York. 127 After noting the Court's authority to
apply laches, 28 the majority compares the present case to Felix v.
Patrick.129 In that case, the Court barred the heirs of an American
Indian from establishing a constructive trust over lands that had
been conveyed by their ancestor in violation of a statutory
restriction, noting that it would be inequitable to void that
grantee's title because of the lapse of time and increased value of
the land at issue. 130 The changes to the land at issue in Felix are
similar to changes in the land at issue in City of Sherrill.131
While laches is often compared to a statute of limitations, it
is important to note, as the Court did in Felix, that this equitable
doctrine also considers the change in conditions of the parties and
the negative impact enforcement of a claim may have on the
defendant. 132 "[T]he essence of laches is not merely lapse of time.
It is essential that there be also acquiescence in the alleged wrong
or lack of diligence in seeking a remedy."'133 However, the failure
of plaintiffs to discover the appropriate remedy for their action
1 34
does not necessarily establish laches or acquiescence.
Closely related to the doctrine of laches in this context is the
126. City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 213 (citing DOBBS, supranote 87, at 3).
127. Id. at 214.
128. See id. at 217 (citing Badger v. Badger, 69 U.S. 87, 94 (1865)) ("[C]ourts of
equity act upon their own inherent doctrine of discouraging, for the peace of
society, antiquated demands, refuse to interfere where there has been gross laches
in prosecuting the claim, or long acquiescence in the assertion of adverse rights.").
129. Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317 (1892).
130. See id.
131. See City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 217. The Court emphasizes this aspect of
laches with language stating that it is not "a mere matter of time; but principally a
question of the inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced-an inequity founded
upon some change in the condition or relations of the property or the parties." Id.
132. See generally 2 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (5th ed.
1941); 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS
ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (14th ed. 1918).
133. S. Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1919).
134. Id. at 490 ("Nor does failure, long continued, to discover the appropriate
remedy, though well known, establish laches where there has been due diligence,
and, as the lower courts have here found, the defendant was not prejudiced by the
delay.").
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rule that "long acquiescence may have [a] controlling effect on the
exercise of dominion and sovereignty over territory."'135 Despite
their continuous protests, 13 6 the Court concluded that the Oneida
were acquiescent in the taking of their lands. The majority
discusses several cases concerning state sovereignty137 which do
not dictate a result for the Oneida's claim, but purportedly
"provide a helpful point of reference."'138
The "longstanding
observances and settled expectations" of sovereign control are
important considerations when considering the boundaries of
139
sovereign control of a territory.
Finally, the majority addresses the principle of impossibility,
arguing that it would be impractical to return the lands at issue to
Indian sovereign control after the lands have been outside its
control for so long. 140 The Supreme Court has historically applied
this doctrine of impossibility to American Indian tribes seeking
14
title to lands that had passed to numerous private landowners. '
The Court, in lieu of restoring the American Indian tribes rightful
title to their lands, orders guilty parties to compensate them for
the loss of their lands. 142 The majority also discusses the burden
on the administration of a "checkerboard" of alternating state and
tribal jurisdiction for state and local governments.143
Using the preceding principles to deny the Oneida the
remedy they seek, the majority then turns to a brief discussion of

135. City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 217 (citing Ohio v. Kentucky, 410 U.S. 641, 651
(1973)).
136. See Oneida Indian Nation v. Oneida County, 719 F.2d 525, 529 (2d Cir.
1983).
137. See California v. Nevada, 447 U.S. 125 (1980); Michigan v. Wisconsin, 270
U.S. 295 (1926); Massachusetts v. New York, 271 U.S. 65 (1926).
138. See City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 218.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 217-20. It should be noted at the outset, and will be argued
subsequently, that the Oneida did not ask for the return of all tribal sovereignty
rights, but rather simply an exemption from taxation by the State of New York.
See id. (noting that if the OIN may reassert sovereign control to take the lands off
of the tax rolls, little would stop them from initiating other litigation to free the
parcels from other regulatory controls). Justice Stevens also makes this point
indirectly in his dissent, arguing that the majority's fear of opening a "Pandora's
Box" of other tribal powers is unfounded. See id. at 227 n.6.
141. See Yankton Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 272 U.S. 351 (1926)
(directing compensation to be paid to the Yankton Sioux because the United States
was unable to restore their fee title after having opened their lands to settlement
by numerous innocent purchasers).
142. See City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 219 (discussing Yankton Sioux Tribe of
Indians, 272 U.S. 351).
143. Id.
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245

what they deem to be the appropriate remedy, requesting that
Congress take the lands into trust for the Oneida in accordance
with federal regulations 144 promulgated toward that end. 145 The
Court does, however, note that "Indian Tribes are having extreme
difficulty completing the 25 C.F.R. Part 151 fee-to-trust
acquisition process because of political issues within the
Department of Interior.146 Such significant difficulties make the
Court's purported remedy highly unlikely to serve the ends of
justice for the Oneida.
IV. Equitable Arguments Not Heard by the Court
Demonstrate that Denying the Oneida the Relief
Sought Was an Erroneous and Inequitable Decision
A. The OneidaAre Not Guilty of Laches because they
Promptly Brought this Action After it Accrued
The majority notes that "[t]he fact that OIN brought this
action promptly after acquiring the properties does not overcome
47
the Oneidas' failure to reclaim ancient prerogatives earlier."'
The Court posits that the Oneida have failed to "reclaim ancient
prerogatives." This is, however, a mischaracterization of what the
Oneida are seeking, and blurs the relief requested in the Oneida's
Complaint with the Court's general understanding of principles of
tribal sovereignty.
In their District Court Complaint, the Oneida requested both
a declaratory judgment and an injunction to shield them from the
imposition of the ad valorem property taxes from Defendants
(Petitioners).148 The essential argument of the Oneida is that the
lands at issue are a part of their reservation and are therefore not
subject to state and local taxation. 149 The federal government has
the power to tax Indian tribes under the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution. 15 0 The Oneida did not purchase fee

144. See 25 U.S.C. § 465 (1983).
145. City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 220.
146. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Power to Tax, the Power to Destroy, and the
Michigan Tribal.State Tax Agreements, 82 U DET. MERcY L. REV. 1, 24 (2004).
147. City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 217 n.1l.
148. Complaint, supra note 58.
149. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
150. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("Congress shall have the power ... to regulate
commerce ... with the Indian tribes.").
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title to the property at issue here until the 1990s.15 1
It is a "standard rule that the limitations period commences
152
when the plaintiff has a 'complete and present' cause of action."
"[A] cause of action does not become 'complete and present' for
limitations purposes until the plaintiff can file suit and obtain
relief."153 The Oneida could not have a "complete and present
cause of action" for tax exemption from the City of Sherrill until it
had acquired the relevant properties within the city and the city
attempted to tax them. Only then could the Oneida file a suit and
obtain relief from the City's attempt to foreclose on the lands that
the Oneida had recently purchased. Thus, the Court's cursory
dismissal of the possibility that the Oneida were in fact timely in
154
bringing this action was erroneous.
B. The Oneida Did Not Sit on Their Rights for TwoHundred Years
Even if it were accepted that the Oneida's cause of action
somehow accrued long before they purchased the parcels of land at
issue here, laches still should not be applied. Contrary to the
Court's representation, the Oneida were not complacent or
acquiescent in the taking of their land between the late 1700s and
the present. "Shortly after [land purchases made in 1784, 1787
and 1788] the Oneidas contacted the federal government in protest
over what they perceived as improper, deceitful, and overreaching
conduct by the State." 155 The Oneida's complaints about the
taking of their land were not well documented prior to 1909, but
"expert witnesses testified that between 1840 and 1875 the
156
Oneidas often attempted to petition the federal government."'
The Oneida typically petitioned through their Indian agent, and in
1874 a group of Oneida actually traveled to Albany, New York, to
151. See Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. City of Sherrill, N.Y., 145 F. Supp. 2d
226, 236 (N.D.N.Y. 2001).
152. Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp.,
Inc., 522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997) (citing Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U.S. 96, 98 (1941)).
153. Id. (citing Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 267 (1993)).
154. City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197, 217
n.l (2005) ("The fact that OIN brought this action promptly after acquiring the
properties does not overcome the Oneidas' failure to reclaim ancient prerogatives
earlier .... "). The Court makes this statement briefly in a footnote, but it begs the
question; why does such promptness not overcome a limitations defense?
155. See Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Oneida County, 719 F.2d 525, 529 (2d
Cir. 1983) (citing American State Papers, 1 Indian Affairs 139 (1834)).
156. Oneida Indian Nation v. Oneida County, 434 F. Supp. 527, 536 (N.D.N.Y.
1977).
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consult with a private law firm. 157 "Between 1909 and 1965, the
Oneidas contacted the federal government innumerable times in
15 8
connection with land claims and other grievances."'
While these persistent complaints did not take the form of
legal actions in the appropriate federal court in New York, such a
requirement would be unconscionable at least in the early years.
Due to the fighting with the French and British during the
formative years of the United States, the Oneida were displaced
from their lands, disorganized, poverty stricken, and dealing with
rampant alcoholism among their people. 159 Literacy in the English
language was another great challenge for the Oneida trying to
retain their tribal lands. 160 The Oneida required translators to
explain the actions of the federal government until 1950.161
Basic principles of equity lay bare the injustice of faulting the
Oneida here and claiming that they negligently sat on their rights.
"[E]quity regards substance rather than form," and "looks to intent
rather than to the form."'1 62 The Oneida's persistent complaints
about the loss of their lands may not have taken the form
preferred by the Supreme Court, but history reflects not a people
acquiescing in their dwindling power, but rather using any means
they could to try to save their lands. The Court, however, focused
on the injustice that could be wrought on the City of Sherrill and
the State of New York if the Oneida were granted tax exemption
on their lands.
This raises another fundamental principle of equity: "[h]e
who comes into equity must come with clean hands."'163 When an
actor is guilty of violating the "fundamental conceptions of equity
jurisprudence, [the court] refuses him all recognition and relief
164
with reference to the subject-matter or transaction in question."'
The State of New York purchased the Oneida lands in violation of
the Non-Intercourse Act,1 65 which was intended to protect the
American Indians from the very loss of lands such as are at issue

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
Id. at 536-37.
Oneida Indian Nation, 434 F.Supp. at 536.
Id.
Id.

162. POMEROY, supra note 132, at 40.

163. Id. at 90.
164. Id. at 91 (emphasis added).
165. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. City of Sherrill, N.Y., 145 F. Supp. 2d 226,
234 (N.D.N.Y. 2001).

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 25:227

here. 166 Secretary of War Pickering specifically notified the State
that they would be making illegal purchases in violation of an Act
intended to protect American Indians from precisely such land
transactions. 167 It should also be noted that the Non-Intercourse
Act considered all sales outside of federal treaties to be void "in
law or equity."1 68 The Non-Intercourse Act recognizes the
significant responsibility the United States Federal government
has to respect and protect American Indian lands reserved by
treaty. Regardless of the difficulties that might be faced by the
State of New York or the City of Sherrill, it is contrary to this
fundamental maxim to invoke principles of equity to deny the
relief to which the Oneida are entitled as a matter of law. This is
especially true when the Oneida are the victims of the State of
New York's intentionalviolation of the Non-Intercourse Act. Thus,
for the Court to ignore the persistent protests of the Oneida over
the loss of their lands because they did not take the proper form,
and to invoke principles of equity to protect the State of New York
and City of Sherrill when they came with "guilty hands," is a
perversion of the fundamental maxims of equity, and far from the
classic conception of equity as the conscience of the law.
C. Legislation and Legislative History Indicate that
Congress Would Not Approve of Invoking the Doctrine of
Laches to Limit American Indian Land Claims
The Non-Intercourse Act was the first action taken by the
United States Congress to protect American Indians from the loss
of their land without giving fair compensation. 69 The Act states
in very clear language that "[n]o purchase, grant, lease, or other
conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any
Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law or
equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered
into pursuant to the Constitution."1 70 Congress made clear its
intent that purchases such as those made by the State of New
York from the Oneida give void title, and cannot be saved even by
an equitable doctrine such as laches.
Further, Congress has passed legislation determinative of the
166. See Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (1790) (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000)).
167. See Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226 (1985).
168. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000) (emphasis added).
169. See Indian Trade and Intercourse Act.
170. Id. (emphasis added).
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time for commencing actions brought by the United States. 171
Therein, Congress set out specific time periods for the United
States government to bring claims for damages on behalf of
172
American Indians unjustly or illegally divested of their lands.
Immediately following the provisions that set the time periods for
bringing these actions, the statute notes that "[n]othing [t]herein
shall be deemed to limit the time for bringing an action to
establish the title to, or right of possession of, real or personal
property."'173 Thus, while this legislation is not directly applicable
to the cause of action brought by the Oneida, it does evidence a
congressional intent to distinguish between limiting claims for
money damages and claims regarding title and possession of real
property. The Supreme Court in Oneida 11 also discussed this
congressional policy against limiting claims. 174 This indicates that
Congress believed land claims should be recognized if supported
by a treaty and should not be denied on the basis of passage of
time.
The preceding actions of Congress signify a desire to protect
American Indians and their tribal lands from encroachment by
powers other than the federal government. While this is not
necessarily controlling, the Supreme Court, in invoking principles
of equity in lieu of clearly established. legal principles, should take
note of the intentions of the legislative branch of the United States
government. These intentions not only indicate the protective
policy of the federal government, but also emphasize the historical
vulnerability of American Indian tribes in land transactions. If
equity is to be invoked to eschew legal principles, it should be to
aid American Indians, not to bar them relief to which they are
legally entitled.
D. Laches Does Not Typically Apply to the United States as
a Sovereign, and Should Not Apply to the Oneidafor the
Same Reasons
The historical vulnerability of the Oneida is also important to
note because of its relationship to the principle "quod nullum
tempus occurit regi-that the sovereign is exempt from the
consequences of its laches, and from the operation of statutes of

171. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2415-16 (2000).

172. See 28 U.S.C. § 2415(b) (2000).
173. 28 U.S.C. § 2415(c) (2000).
174. Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226, 240-42 (1985).
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limitations."' 175 Justice Story has noted that the reason for this
doctrine is the "great public policy of preserving the public rights,
revenues, and property from injury and loss, by the negligence of
''176
public officers.
While this principle has traditionally only been invoked on
behalf of the United States as a sovereign, the rationale for the
principle is equally pertinent for American Indian tribes. The
majority in City of Sherrill holds the Oneida Indian Nation
accountable for the losses of its individual members, thus
according it the obligations of a sovereign. Important privileges of
a sovereign, however, are completely absent. While the principle
of quod nullum tempus occurit regi may not be controlling law, it is
highly persuasive authority that implicates the serious
impropriety of invoking the equitable doctrine of laches to deny
the Oneida relief. The Oneida complained often of their treatment
and the loss of their lands, 177 and requiring the Oneida Indian
Nation to fulfill every obligation as a sovereign while allowing
them none of the privileges works a grave injustice on the
individual members who were not in control of the tribe's
transactions.
The principle of quod nullum tempus occurit regi and the
other aforementioned equitable arguments are all compelling
reasons not to use equity to deny the Oneida the relief they seek
for a valid cause of action. The Court did not simply reject these
arguments, but violated its own rules in a manner that barred the
Oneida from even making them in full to the Court.
Conclusion
The horrific treatment that American Indians in the United
States have received is no secret to the general public. Stories
about this tragic history are still printed across the country. Jim
Dawson, writing for the Minneapolis Star Tribune, noted:
How many Indians died isn't known, but the numbers are
likely in the tens of millions. While estimates vary greatly, the
consensus is that there were from 50 to 60 million Indians in
the hemisphere when Columbus came, and that number had
dropped by an estimated 70 to 80 percent by the end of the
1800s. While anthropologists disagree about the numbers,
175. United States v. Peoples Household Furnishings, Inc., 75 F.3d 252, 254 (6th
Cir. 1996) (citing Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 132
(1938)).
176. Id. (citations omitted).
177. See supra notes 155-61 and accompanying text.
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they agree on the biological devastation that exterminated
countless Indian tribes and rapidly reduced
others from great
178
civilizations to fragile shells of existence.
The shameful treatment of American Indians at the hands of
the United States government often has little bearing on the
specific legal principles applied to cases in a court of law. When
the Supreme Court goes beyond strictly applying the law,
however, and delves into the realm of equity, the conscience of the
law, consideration of this long history of injustice is of utmost
importance. The majority in City of Sherrill makes much of the
difficulty that would be worked on the City of Sherrill if they
allowed the Oneida to exercise their sovereign right to be free of
local taxes on the parcels of land at issue. 179 If the majority
considers the hardships worked on the City of Sherrill because it
cannot tax Oneida tribal lands, it follows that it should also
consider the hardships worked upon the Oneida after hundreds of
years of physical and cultural genocide, and the impracticality of
requiring the oppressed Oneida Indian Nation to take prompt
legal actions that are not even required of the much more powerful
and organized United States government.
Outside the realm of equity, the Supreme Court has
recognized the unique obligations of the United States to
American Indians, as well as the unique nature of tribal
sovereignty. The Court has stated that, "[w]ithout regard to its
source, sovereign power, even when unexercised, is an enduring
presence that governs all contracts subject to the sovereign's
jurisdiction, and will remain intact unless surrendered in
unmistakable terms."1o It must be noted that the Court was here
discussing the possible surrender of sovereign powers via a
commercial contract. The Court was, however, very adamant
about the nature of sovereign powers in general, noting that "[t]o
presume that a sovereign forever waives the right to exercise one
of its sovereign powers unless it expressly reserves the right to
exercise that power in a commercial agreement turns the concept
of sovereignty on its head."' 1
The point is that silence is not
equivocal to a relinquishment of sovereign powers.
American Indian tribal sovereignty is not simply a privilege

178. Jim Dawson, Exploration brought devastation; Disease and warfare
decimated native cultures, STAR TRIB., Oct. 5, 1992, at 1A.
179. See supra notes 140-43143 and accompanying text.
180. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 (1982).
181. Id.
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granted to American Indians by their benevolent conqueror; it is a
right that was never ceded, but was slowly eroded by the United
States government through years of warfare.
Further, if one considers that the Court has previously
recognized that money damages for land claims are an acceptable
remedy, 8 2 the Court's reasoning becomes suspect. Forcing the
City of Sherrill or State of New York to pay a large sum in
compensation for lands illegally taken from the Oneida, or forcing
them to lose money by an inability to tax the Oneida, would seem
to result in a similar financial hardship. Regardless, when one
group is subjugated and oppressed by another, justice and equity
will require a change in situations, wherein the oppressed group
gains ground, while the oppressor loses some.
The majority here decided a case on equitable principles not
raised or fairly included within the questions raised in the Petition
for Writ of Certiorari, and has denied the Oneida their due process
right to be heard. This alone is a grave injustice. According to the
Court's own rules and precedent, allowing a party to respond to all
arguments against it is fundamental to due process. To invoke
equity to deny the Oneida relief for a valid cause of action without
even allowing the Oneida to fully address those equitable
principles is a perversion of the very concept of equity.
Lagwilondonwas once spoke of the Oneida's fierce loyalty to
the United States, even while others in the Iroquois confederacy
were supporting the British government. He said:
[the Loyalist Iroquois] are wallowing in plenty, while we are
pining in poverty and all this is occasioned by our attachment
to you. Brothers-It is well known that the defection of part of
them
our Confederacy is owing to the frequent presents made
83
by the King, but we are determined to adhere to you.'
It is a sad memorial to such loyalty and bravery that the United
States Supreme Court now denies the great Oneida Indian Nation
the relief and rights they are owed. Such was not the sentiment of
the Oneida when their people suffered and their warriors fought
and died to help the founding fathers create the United States of
America. "Great nations, like great men, should keep their
word."'18 4 The Oneida kept theirs.
182. See Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226 (1985) (holding that the Oneida have a live
cause of action for lands taken illegally and allowing them to sue for fair rental
value).
183. Lagwilondonwas, supranote 1.
184. Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960)
(Black, J., dissenting).

